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THE ENTITLEMENT TO MUNICIPAL WATER
SERVICE: CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE
TERMINATION OF A PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICE
The federal judiciary has developed the concept of "entitlement"
as a new form of property interest to be protected in conformity with
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment., The United
States Supreme Court and several lower federal courts have employed
the entitlement concept to protect against termination of a myriad
of governmental benefits by administrative discretion- e.g., govern-
mental contracts,2 unemployment compensation,3 welfare benefits, 4
motorists' licenses, 5 occupational licenses,6 and continued residency
in public and subsidized housing.7 The Court, however, has not
1. For the academic origin of the concept of "entitlement" see Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1255 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For
an historical discussion of the former right-privilege bifurcation in government
benefit analysis see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
2. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
4. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
5. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
6. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
7. The entitlement to continued residency in public and subsidized housing
has elicited procedural due process requirements in administrative decisions on
tenant evictions and rent increases. Lower federal courts have applied different
due process hearing requirements in the two situations. The Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), procedural due process hearing and notice requirements
have been applied to evictions. For a discussion of these requirements see the
text at notes 20-25 infra. For the leading cases applying Goldberg requirements
see Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971), and Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority,
425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). In rent increase
decisions tenants of low-rent public housing and of low- and moderate-income
housing, constructed under the section 221 (d) (3) program of the National
Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1970), have been accorded the right
to receive notice of proposed rent increases and to participate in the adminis-
trative determination of rent increases by making written presentations. Compare
Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Thompson v. Washington,
497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing
Authority, 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973), with Langevin v. Chenango Court,
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developed the related concept of "fundamental interest" as a tech-
nique to protect entitlements under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.8 In Davis v. Weir9 a consumer's property
interest in municipal water service was recognized as an entitlement
under the due process clause, yet not as a fundamental interest under
the equal protection clause.' 0
Davis involved a tenant whose water service was terminated by the
Atlanta Department of Water Works because his landlord failed to
pay the bill.- The water department notified the landlord, but not
the consumer-tenant, of the impending termination of service. Plain-
tiff-tenant filed a section 1983 class action"z seeking to enjoin defend-
Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971), and Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st
Cir. 1970).
In examining the due process hearing requirement the Thompson court dis.
tinguished eviction and rent increase situations by reference to the adjudicative
and legislative nature, respectively, of the administrative decisions involved:
Most of the cases which established a due process right to hearing were
concerned with individualized determinations-suspension or revocation of
licenses, termination of statutory benefits to individuals, dispossession of
property. In those cases individual hearings, with some oral presentation,
were well nigh indispensable to the airing of the critical questions. Where,
as here, the issues involved affect a class of citizens, there is a need to impose
some limits to keep the proceeding manageable. While it is impossible to
anticipate all the issues which could be raised in a rent-increase dispute,
tenants are most likely to be concerned with the landlord's costs, level of
services, alternative sources of revenue, and tenants' ability to pay increased
rent. On these matters, we believe, tenants will have adequate opportunity
to express their views, if they are afforded a hearing of the type prescribed
by the Administrative Procedure Act for rule-making proceedings: an oppor-
tunity to make written presentations.
Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT §§ 7.01-.06 (3d ed. 1972).
8. Cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 38-40 (1972); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in The Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1, 8, 46-48 (1973).
9. 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. Id. at 144.
11. In the six-month period from April 14 to October 14, 1970, the single
water meter at the multi-dwelling unit, in which plaintiff and his family were
the only residents, registered use of over 1.98 million gallons of water, for which
a $1,433 bill was received. By December 1970 the landlord's debt was approxi-
mately $1,800. Appendix in The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit at 27-28, Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. In 1973 the district court held that injunctive relief would be granted to
a class constituting "all present and future non-commercial users of water service
provided by the City of Atlanta, Department of Water Works." Davis v. Weir,
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ant-water department from terminating service to his premises and
from refusing to contract directly with him for continued water
service.1 Plaintiff contended that due process notice and an adminis-
trative hearing were required prior to the termination of an "essen-
tial" public service and that defendant's refusal to contract with him
solely because of the financial obligation of a third party, the land-
lord, violated the equal protection clause. A federal district court
held that the termination of a tenant's water service because of his
landlord's debt was a deprivation of a property interest entitled to
protection under the due process clause.'4 The court also held the
Atlanta ordinance authorizing the termination procedure'5 invalid
under the equal protection clause. The ordinance unreasonably
classified applicants for water service by refusing service to persons
whose premises were burdened with a lien for pre-existing debts.16
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that a lien against the default-
ing debtor's service address should not deprive an unindebted tenant
359 F. Supp. 1023, 1028 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The Fifth Circuit held that, as a
class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the class should include only "residential consumers of water furnished
by the City of Atlanta, Department of Water Works, who have not contracted
with the City for water service in their own names." 497 F.2d at 147; cf. Ihrke
v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated and dismissed
as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1775 (1972).
13. See 497 F.2d at 141-42. Suit was brought to contest the validity of sections
33-129 and 33-130 of the 1965 Code of Ordinances of the City of Atlanta and
section 7.6.16 of the Charter and Related Laws of the City of Atlanta. Id. at
141 n.2, 142 n.3.
14. Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317, 320-22 (N.D. Ga. 1971), clarified, 359 F.
Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The 1973 decision was issued to clarify a class action
controversy arising from Davis' representing the class of "users of water services
furnished by the City of Atlanta who do not have a contract for water service
in their own names." 359 F. Supp. at 1024-25.
15. Section 7.6.16 of the Charter and Related Laws of the City of Atlanta
states:
The mayor and board of aldermen, or said committee, shall have full power
and authority to require payment in advance for the use or rent of water fur-
nished by them, in or upon any building, place or premises, and, in case
prompt payment shall not be made, they may shut off the water from such
building, place or premises, and shall not be compelled again to supply said
building, place or premises with water until such arrears, with interest thereon,
shall be fully paid.
497 F.2d at 142 n.3.
16, 359 F. Supp. at 1026-27; 328 F. Supp. at 322-23.
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from contracting for service with the municipal water department. 1"
The theoretical foundation for procedural due process require-
ments in terminating a public utility service is grounded upon two
United States Supreme Court decisions.18 Goldberg v. Kellylo held
that welfare benefits could not be terminated without adequate
17. 497 F.2d 139; see Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1227 (1968):
Municipalities and public utility companies have frequently sought reimburse-
ment of unpaid charges for utilities from the property served itself, or someone
connected with the property, such as an occupant or owner, other than the
one who incurred the charges. The conventional rule has been that liability
for the debt of another cannot be imposed in the absence of special agreement
or statutory authorization for a lien on the property, and ordinances or regula-
tions seeking to impose such liability have usually been held unreasonable in
the absence of an authorized lien.
Id. at 1232; cf. 2 C. ANTmAU, LOCAL GOVERNMFNT LAW §§ 19.10-.12 (1970);
12 E. MCQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.92 (3d ed. rev. 1970).
The Georgia judiciary has developed a minority doctrine that municipal water
services are legally deemed to be received by the premises rather than by its
residents and that a quasi-lien could be imposed on the real property and collected
from the present resident prior to the continuance of service. Under this doctrine,
Georgia courts have validated ordinances that permitted local officials to termi-
nate or to condition continued water service to dwellings upon the payment of
the debts incurred at the building. No distinction was made as to the contractual
status of the applicant for further service. See Harrison v. Jones, 226 Ga. 344,
175 S.E.2d 26 (1970); City of Atlanta v. Burton, 90 Ga. 486, 16 S.E. 214
(1892). But see Dodd v. City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33, 113 S.E. 166 (1922). In
Davis this judicial development was criticized:
Although the defendants assert that the power to discontinue service for
nonpayment, which is authorized by Section 7.6.16 of the City Charter, . . .
is a "specie of a lien," neither that language nor any other state law or
local ordinance cited by the defendants expressly creates a lien for unpaid
water bills. The Water Works concedes that it has never foreclosed on such
a lien and that no recordation devices exist to place such an encumbrance
on record.
497 F.2d at 145 n.9; accord, Oliver v. Hyle, 513 P.2d 806 (Ore. App. 1973).
18. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). For an application of Fuentes and Goldberg to the removal for cause
of a nonprobationary federal employee see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974). In Arnett the Court held that provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
and implementing regulations did not violate procedural due process by failing
to afford an adjudicative hearing prior to the removal of a nonprobationary
federal employee. The Court distinguished the nature of the property interests
protected in Fuentes and Goldberg from that of the interest in Arnett: "Since
the purpose of such a hearing in such a case [the removal of a nonprobationary
federal employee] is to provide the person 'an opportunity to clear his name,' a
hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the actual dismissal
is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 157.
19. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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notice and a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.20 The Court
constructed a balancing test to guide the judiciary in determining
the constitutionally required elements for notice and an evidentiary
hearing. Two factors must be considered: the necessity of the service
to human subsistence and the countervailing governmental interest
in conserving fiscal and administrative resources.2' The Court de-
fined the requisites for a pre-termination procedure as: (1) timely
and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termina-
tion,22 (2) an effective opportunity to defend, including confronta-
tion of any adverse witnesses and the oral presentation of arguments
and evidence,23 (3) an oral statement of position, (4) representation
by retained counsel if desired, (5) an impartial decision-maker,24 and
(6) a decision that sets forth evidence relied upon and reasons for
the result.25
After numerous federal court decisions applying the Goldberg
rationale to protect governmental benefits under procedural due
process,2 the Court turned its attention to the protection of a "sig-
20. For a discussion of the historical development of procedural due process
guarantees in the welfare area see O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied:
The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 SuP. CT. Rv. 161, 165-202. An empirical
study from one jurisdiction revealed that administrative decisions to terminate
welfare benefits to specific recipients have been reversed with significant fre-
quency. See Handler, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in AFDC-
The Wisconsin Experience, 43 Soc. SERVICE REV. 12, 22 (1969).
21. Unfortunately, the countervailing governmental interest category was left
vague. For a description of the Fuentes model's articulation of the government
interest in the balancing test see note 35 infra.
22. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
23. Essential to this protection is that the burden of proof fall upon the
governmental unit. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 524 (1958). Goldberg
presents a model of the pre-termination hearing as a probable cause determina-
tion to lessen the risk of erroneous termination of welfare benefits. See Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 201 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
24. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 198 (1974) (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Dailey, Due Process Requirements for Resi-
dential Utility Service Termination, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE PtV. 540 (1973).
25. These essentials for reasoned administrative decision-making are in accord
with Professor Kenneth Davis' ideal for curtailing arbitrary discretion by agencies.
See K, DAvis, supra note 7, §§ 4.04, 6.05.
26. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430
(5th Cir. 1970); Java v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 317 F.
Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff"d, 402 U.S. 121 (1971); Sostre v. Rockefeller,
312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1975]
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nificant property interest," i.e. the consumer's equitable interest
under conditional sales contracts in the continued possession and
use of chattels before transfer of title. In Fuentes v. Shevin27 the
Court invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorizing
seizure under a writ of replevin of chattels in the consumer's pos-
session. These statutes authorized state agents to seize secured
consumer goods upon the ex parte application of a creditor who
claimed a right to them and posted a security bond.28 The statutes
differed as to the procedural requirements for the creditor's pro-
curement of a writ of replevin. 29 Neither, however, gave the debtor,
prior to the seizure of the specified chattel, 0 the right to adequate
notice or a due process hearing on the merits of conflicting claims.
The Fuentes Court held that notice and an opportunity for an
administrative hearing must precede state-authorized seizures of
property in the debtor's possession.3'
27. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
28. Id. at 73-78. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1974),
the Court held that the issuance of a sequestration writ under the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure did not violate procedural due process under Fuentes. In
reaching its holding the Court distinguished the sequestration statute from the
Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes invalidated under the Fuentes doctrine:
The Louisiana sequestration statute followed in this case mandates a con-
siderably different procedure. A writ of sequestration is available to a mort-
gage or lien holder to forestall waste or alienation of the property, but
different from the Florida and Pennsylvania systems, bare conclusionary claims
of ownership or lien will not suffice under the Louisiana statute. Article 3501
authorizes the writ "only when the nature of the claim and the amount thereof,
if any, and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appear
from specific facts" shown by verified petition or affidavit. Moreover, in the
parish where this case arose, the requisite showing must be made to a judge
and judicial authorization obtained . ..
[Tjhe facts relevant to obtaining a writ of sequestration are narrowly con-
fined. . . . [D]ocumentary proof is particularly suited for questions of the
existence of a vendor's lien and the issue of default ....
Louisiana law expressly provides for an immediate hearing and dissolution
of the writ "unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was
issued."
Id. at 616-18. For a critique of Mitchell see Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.:
The 1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due Process, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 182
(1974). A careful reading of footnote 14 in Mitchell should assuage fears that
the decision will have precedential value for overruling Fuentes when judicial
supervision over the seizure or foreclosure proceeding is lacking. 416 U.S. at
620 n.14. For a confirmation of the theory that Mitchell represents a narrow
exception to the Fuentes doctrine see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1975).
29. 407 U.S. at 73-78.
30. Id. at 75-78.
31. Id. at 80-83; accord, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971).
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In reaching its holding, the Court altered the Goldberg methodology
for procedural due process analysis. Under the Fuentes approach,
gradations in the significance of property interests in consumer goods
are relevant primarily to the form of both the notice and hearing
required by due processA2 The notice and hearing requirement will
apply to protect "significant property interests" regardless of their rela-
tive importance to the respective consumer.33 Utilitarian considerations
of cost efficiency in judicial administration cannot outweigh the
requirement of notice and a hearing.3 Postponement of the pro-
cedural safeguard will be justified only by the existence of circum-
stances satisfying the "extraordinary situation" test. s5
32. 407 U.S. at 87 n.18, 89 n.20, 90 n.21, 97 n.33; see Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 US. 371, 378 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. 407 U.S. at 88-90. The Court attempted to rationalize its alteration of the
Goldberg entitlement theory:
[The district courts] reasoned that Sniadach and Goldberg . . . established
no more than that a prior hearing is required with respect to the deprivation
of such basically "necessary" items as wages and welfare benefits.
This reading of Sniadach and Goldberg reflects the premise that those cases
marked a radical departure from established principles of procedural due
process. They did not. Both decisions were in the mainstream of past cases,
having little or nothing to do with the absolute "necessities" of life but es-
tablishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before a
deprivation of property takes effect.
Id. at 88 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id. at 90 P.22, 92 n.29. The Court states:
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and
it is often more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing.
But these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right ...
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate
all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the
person whose possessions are about to be taken.
Id. at 90 n.22. But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608-09
(1974). In Mitchell the creditor's risk of property devaluation from the debtor's
use of the property was calculated into the cost analysis. See also J. WHITE & R.
SUMNIERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 974-75 (1972).
35. 407 U.S. at 90-93. The "extraordinary situation" test may be applied to
justify the lack of pre-seizure notice and hearing, but the existence of three con-
ditions must first be established:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an im-
portant governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a
special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control
over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has
been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards
of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the par-
ticular instance. Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property
to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a
1975]
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Several lower federal courts have held that regulated utility cor-
porations, in terminating residential utility service, act "under color
of state action" given the degree of state utility regulation, the
utility's monopolistic character, the essential nature of the utility
service to human existence, and the special state-authorized privi-
leges of entry to private property and eminent domainA Certain
national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure,
and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food.
Id. at 91-92; see Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950);
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); North Am.
Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). For an application
of the "extraordinary situation" test in a critique of the Mitchell holding see
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629-30 n.1 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
In Davis defendants tried to justify the municipal water department's termi.
nation procedure under the "extraordinary situation" analysis. They argued:(1) that the present termination procedure was necessary as the only cost
effective device for the collection of debts without the institution of a unilateral
rate increase; (2) that a special need existed for prompt action in the termina-
tion of a utility service that can not be "repossessed;" and (3) that municipal
ordinances carefully narrow the administrative decision to terminate. Appendix,
supra note 11, at 261-62. Plaintiffs disputed the appropriateness of applying the
"extraordinary situation" test to this particular utility termination:
Defendants contend that summary termination is necessary because water is
consumed and cannot be repossessed.... The Defendants cannot legitimately
claim that speedy action is necessary when they operate on a two month
billing cycle and in the Willie Davis case allowed an extraordinary bill to
accumulate over a six month period. The Defendants further contend they
fit within the extraordinary circumstances of Fuentes because the power to
terminate is vested in a governmental official who may act only within the
narrow confines of the City Charter. But the Charter hardly contains a detailed
set of regulations controlling termination in due process terms as does the
Internal Revenue Code. In fact, the Charter and Ordinances permit the
Water Department to terminate service upon three days notice to the tenant
or owner, if the account is delinquent ...
Id. at 289-90.
36. See Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Bronson
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stanford v. Gas
Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972). See also Adams v. Southern
California First Nat'1 Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 334-36 (9th Cir. 1973).
In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court has held that, for the
purposes of the fourteenth amendment, a regulated utility corporation does not
act "under color of state action" given that the utility "was a heavily regulated
private utility, enjoying at least a partial monopoly in the providing of electrical
service within its territory, and that it elected to terminate service to petitioner
in a manner which the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission found per-
missible under state law." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449,
457 (1974). As a precedent for the determination of "state action" in adminis-
trative decisions of regulated utilities, Jackson must be limited to factual situa-
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regulated utilities have thus been held subject to due process challenges
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.Yr In applying Fuentes
and Goldberg, lower federal courts have considered the following
factors significant in determining what form the pre-termination
notice and hearing procedure must take: (1) the adequacy of the
notice to inform the consumer of a proposed service termination- 8
in that the notice be sufficiently in advance of a hearing to permit
him to formulate a defense 9 and to provide suggestions for the
resolution of the debt through internal administrative procedure,40
(2) the degree of administrative reliance upon computers for bill-
ing,"1 (3) the efficiency of the billing service in providing a uniform
billing schedule,42 (4) the existence of empirical evidence indicating
tions in which there is no delegation of some state power "which is traditionally
associated with sovereignty," i.e. eminent domain. Id. at 454. Under Jackson
such factors as the monopoly status of a regulated utility, the degree of state
regulation, and the essential nature of the utility service should be applied to
the test of "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 453; accord, Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For a discussion of sovereign and municipal
immunity from suit under section 1983 class actions see A. LAFRANCE, M.
SCHROEDER, R. BENNETT & W. BOYD, LAW OF THE POOR 459-65 (1973). See
also Haydock, State Action: Public Utilities and the Public Interest, 6 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REv. 69 (1972).
38. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1973).
See also Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). In Palmer an employee of the company called a "collector" to terminate
service at plaintiff's residence. The employee was vested with the discretion to
terminate the service without notice to the residents. In Bronson only the follow-
ing warning was sent to plaintiff's address prior to termination: "YOUR SERV-
ICE WILL BE DISCONTINUED UNLESS THE TOTAL AMOUNT SHOWN
BELOW IS PAID BY MAR 02 1970." Id. at 450. Hence, plaintiff-consumer
was not notified that she could register a complaint with Consolidated Edison
or the New York Public Service Commission prior to the termination.
39. Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 166-67 (6th Cir. 1973).
40. Id. at 167-68.
41. See Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 672 n.28 (7th
Cir. 1972) (Sprecher, J., dissenting): "The defendant utility disavowed any
'computer error' among its 646 annual errors 'due to human agency.' Of course
from one viewpoint, a computer is incapable of error; only the computer operator
makes errors. Nor can anyone know how many errors go undetected in the
course of the year." Id.
42. See Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 157 (6th Cir. 1973).
In Palmer the Columbia Gas Company instituted a system of meter calculation
whereby an actual reading would follow a series of several computer estimates.
1975]
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whether a large number of the complaints actually investigated by
the utility or the state regulatory commission resulted in adjustments
favorable to the consumer,43 (5) the impartiality of the decision-
maker,44 and (6) the adequacy of litigation as an alternative to a
pre-termination hearing.45 In determining the form of the due process
hearing, federal court decisions have placed particular emphasis upon
the requirements that the utility company bear the burden of proof40
and that the decision-maker be sufficiently free from the internal
pressures of the state regulatory apparatus to protect the utility's
autonomy in its collection procedure.47
Two recent decisions4s have held that, under Fuentes, the utility
must be allowed broad discretion in establishing notice and termina-
tion hearing requirements. 49 Essential to the reliance upon adminis-
The actual reading would often be considerably higher than the previous esti-
mates. For instance, one plaintiff received a $200 bill following a series of bills
between $10 and $15. Id. at 157 ,& n.2.
43. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 448 n.11 (S.D.N.Y.
1972): "[Sixteen percent] of those complaints actually investigated by the Public
Service Commission result in adjustments in favor of the customer." Id. Sec also
Comment, The Shutoff of Utility Services for Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor,
46 WASH. L. REv. 745 (1971).
44. See Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). In Bronson the court found that the New York Public Service Commis.
sion's investigation procedure relied upon the utility to assemble the necessary
data. During a six month period in 1972, 9,385 billing inquiries had been re-
ceived by the Public Service Commission, with 8,886 being "processed." Id. at 450.
45. See Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 62-64 (D. Minn. 1972). For analysis
of these judicial alternatives see notes 50-54 and accompanying text infra.
46. See note 23 supra. Such shifting of the burden of proof is consistent with
the common law rule of Wood v. City of Auburn, 87 Me. 287, 293, 32 A. 906,
908 (1895):
It is said, however, that the consumer can apply to the courts to recover
back any sum he is thus compelled to pay, if it was not justly due from
him, or, if he can show affirmatively that it is not a just claim against him,
he can, by judicial process, restrain the company or municipality from
shutting off the water. To oblige a person to follow such a course would
be a violation of the fundamental juristic principle of procedure. That
principle is that the claimant, not the defendant, shall resort to judicial
process; that he who asserts something to be due him, not he who denies a
debt, shall have the burden of judicial action and proof.
47. In Palmer, Bronson, Stanford and Lamb the factor of the public service
commission's undue reliance upon the public utility was essential to the determi-
nation of state action and the application of Goldberg due process requirements.
48. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974); Lucas v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
49. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 653 (7th Cir. 1972).
The Lucas court distinguished electric service from statutory entitlements such
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trative discretion is the courts' faith in three alternative judicial
remedies-the equitable remedy of injunction, payment under pro-
test followed by a suit for a refund, and a remedy at law for damages.50
The majority of federal decisions question the efficacy of these alter-
native remedies. For the low-income consumer, the cost of obtaining
an injunction is prohibitive.5 1 By pursuing legal remedies, the con-
sumer may be deprived of an essential service without due process5 2
pending judgment. The disputed amounts are often insufficient to
justify the expense of litigation."3 Finally, the consumer-plaintiff
must satisfy an imposing burden of proof for injunctive relief-
"identification of a right to be protected; a showing of irreparable
injury: a showing of an inadequate remedy at law; and a showing
that there is a likelihood of prevailing on the merits." 4
The Davis court specified a form that would satisfy the procedural
due process notice requirement. Notice must be mailed to the occu-
pants of the serviced premises. It must state that the user may
contract with the water department in the user's own name and
must assure the user that water service will not be contingent upon
the payment of the delinquent bill of a third party.55
Davis does not impose an evidentiary hearing upon the public
utility and the consumer to resolve the dispute over the landlord's
as welfare benefits. Thus the Goldberg due process requirements were held to
be inapplicable to the termination of electric services by a utility corporation.
In his dissent Circuit Judge Sprecher stated:
The defendant utility is not infallible. It admitted to 646 errors during a
recent calendar year. There is no reason why the present preliminary in-
formal negotiations betwcen utility and customer which unearthed these
errors would not continue if notice and hearing were required prior to
threatened disconnection. Despite the 10,000 service disconnections by de-
fendant utility each year, in a recent calendar year only 71 persons went
so far with their disputes as to contact the Public Service Commission, the
Better Business Bureau, a newspaper or a public utility officer.
Id. at 671-72.
50. Id. at 648-50.
51. Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 63 (D. Minn. 1972): "The injunctive
remedy, in particular, is burdensome and expensive. M.S.A. § 585.04 requires
posting of a minimum $250.00 bond as a prerequisite to issuance of a temporary
injunction." Id.
52. See Note, The Emerging Constitutional Issues in Public Utility Consumer
Law. 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 744, 757-58 (1972).
53. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 449 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
54. Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 63 (D. Minn. 1972).
55. Davis v. Weir, 359 F. Supp. 1023, 1025-26, 1028 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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bill. The court reasoned that the consumer would be an inappro-
priate participant in the utility-landlord conflictA5 Thus the court
avoided the problem of explicating the nature of the due process
evidentiary hearing-a task made particularly difficult given the
Fuentes rule that no specific guidelines shall govern the creditor's.
standard of proof and the minimal procedural safeguards necessary
for the protection of the debtor's defense.15
The Davis holding that the Atlanta ordinance unreasonably clas-
sified applicants for residential utility service presents a common
dichotomy in constitutional jurisprudence, i.e. between the "strict
scrutiny" and "rational relationship" tests for equal protection analy-
56. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, INC., MODEL RESIDENTIAL
UTILITY SERVICE REGULATIONS (1974). The Model Regulations have been
developed to comply with Davis procedural due process requirements. Articles
five, six and seven present a structured administrative process for collection
policy and termination consistent with the requirements and spirit of the Gold-
berg and Davis decisions. The pre-termination evidentiary hearing is designed
as a final safeguard; both negotiations between the utility and consumer and
informal review are encouraged prior to the commencement of the Goldberg
due process hearing. The informal review process of article six features an
impartial complaint officer selected by the state or municipal regulatory agency.
The officer's order will include an offer for a deferred payment agreement or
an extension agreement.
In both article four, part two (extension agreements), and article five (termi-
nation procedure), the notice and hearing requirements of Davis are specifically
related to the plight of the apartment building resident. The Model Regulations
supersede the protections of Davis by its extension agreement procedure within
the provision for the informal review or hearing:
As part of the informal review or hearing, the model provides that multiple
dwelling residents shall have the right to negotiate an extension agreement
for continued service without liability for any outstanding debt or delinquent
account of the landlord. §§ 4.201, 5.103(g), 6.102(4), 7.104(5). This
agreement may take any workable form by which payment for current service
can be arranged. § 4.203. However, where single meter-single account
service can be installed simply by installation of metering equipment, each
resident shall have the right to an extension agreement for that service,
subject to the deposits and eligibility requirements of Article 2. § 4.202.
National Consumer Law Center, Inc., supra at 14-15. It is the goal of the Model
Regulations that single meter-single account service for multi-unit dwellings will
replace master metering and thereby facilitate contractual independence between
the tenant and the utility.
57. In Fuentes the burden of proof of the creditor before the hearing is
satisfied by "establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity . . . of
the underlying claim against the alleged debtor. . . ." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 97 (1972). But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (White,
3., dissenting). See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
For a presentation of the minimum due process hearing requirements of
Goldberg see notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
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sis. Under the former test, the Supreme Court has analyzed whether
state legislation adversely affects "fundamental interests '5 8 or is based
upon a "suspect dassification."59 Given a suspect classification or an
affected fundamental interest, the legislation must be shown neces-
sary to the promotion of a "compelling state interest" in order to
establish constitutional validity.60 Under the rational relationship test,
the state need only prove that the legislation was rationally related
to some legitimate state policy.-
The bifurcation of equal protection analysis into two distinct
theories has been questioned in several of Mr. Justice Marshall's
dissents., '! The Marshall paradigm for equal protection analysis
establishes a single inquiry based on the following factors: "the
character of the classification in question, the relative importance
to the individuals in the class discriminated against of the govern-
mental benefits they do not receive, and the asserted state interests
in support of the classification." 33 Several recent Court decisions
have been interpreted by both academic and judicial authorities as
employing the Marshall paradigm under the language of the tradi-
tional "rational relationship" test.64 Functionally, the Davis analysis
58. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942). See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HAi'v. L. REv. 1065, 1127-31 (1969).
59. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (alienage);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (race); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (nationality).
60. See Developments in the Law, supra note 58, at 1101-04, 1121-23.
61. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). See also Developments in the Law, supra
note 58, at 1076-87.
62. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-
133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90
(1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 517-21
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For an application of the Marshall paradigm
to the examination of the validity of a state financing system for public educa-
tion see id. at 110-33.
64. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 18-19:
In seven of the fifteen basic equal protection decisions, the Court upheld
the constitutional claim or remanded it for consideration without mentioning
the "strict scrutiny" formula.... After the years in which the strict scrutiny-
1975]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
is in accord with this interpretation. Without the semantics of either
the "fundamental rights" or the "suspect classification" tests for strict
scrutiny, the Davis decision represents the first application of tradi-
tional "rational relationship" doctrine to protect consumer-tenant
interests from the administrative discretion of public utilities.05
The Davis court implicitly applied the Marshall paradigm to
invalidate the provisions of the Atlanta ordinance authorizing the
termination of water service. First, the court questioned the classifi-
cation of applicants based upon residence at a service address
encumbered by the pre-existing debt of a third party. Secondly,
the court stated that water service was basic to the habitability of
multi-unit dwellings.6 Finally, the court analyzed the state's in-
invalidation and minimal scrutiny-nonintervention correlations were virtually
perfect, the pattern has suddenly become unsettled. After an era during which
the "mere rationality" requirement symbolized virtual judicial abdication, the
Court-following personnel changes in a noninterventionist direction-has
suddenly found repeated occasions to intervene on the basis of the deferential
standard ...
Id. The seven cases cited by Gunther for the 1971 term of the Supreme Court
are: James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Note that Weber and Stanley did not formally adopt the traditional "rational
relationship" test. Essential to Gunther's model of judicial intervention (upholding
constitutional claims through the application of the deferential standard of
"rational relationship") is its utility as an avoidance strategy. Gunther, supra
note 8, at 25-30. For example, in.Jackson and Eisenstadt the Court avoided
constitutional issues relating to the cruel and unusual punishment clause and to
the right of privacy, respectively. Id. at 29.
In its 1972 term the Court, in United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973), applied the Gunther model to the protection of welfare
rights. The Court held that section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §
2012(e) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970), created an
irrational classification by excluding from participation in the food stamp program
any "household" containing an individual who was not related to any other
member. The Court found that section 3 (e) had no rational relationship to the
governmental interest of minimizing fraud in the administration of the program.
413 U.S. at 538. For a further discussion of the Moreno decision's relation to
the Gunther Model see 8 URBAN L. ANN. 289 (1974).
65. 497 F.2d at 143-46.
66. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT
CODE §§ 2-203(1)(d), (f) (Tent. Draft 1969) (landlord's duty to supply and
maintain the dwelling adequately). For a decision applying an implied war-
ranty of habitability concept in all urban rental leases see Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970). See also Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168,
1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,
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terest in collecting water charges from multi-unit dwellings
with a single water meter and the municipality's interest in its
revenue bond rating. The court held the classification of applicants
invalid for failing to distinguish credit-risk consumers and non-
credit-risk consumers.r7 The collection scheme, in the court's view,
disregarded the legal accountability of the debtor for the service
charges.8 No valid governmental interest in protecting the municipal
revenue bond rating was found to justify the intolerable effects of
the utility's action-forcing the tenants either to pay the landlord's
utility bill, or remain in a residence that would rapidly become
uninhabitable without water service, or vacate the residence. 69 The
tenant's conditional right to continued utility service is justified
since it does not affect the ultimate suit against the debtor-landlord."0
The water department's fear that its municipal revenue bond rating
would suffer was considered illusory given "the concededly small
number of similar applicants, the miniscule percentage of the depart-
ment's revenue that is affected, the minimal cost of instituting con-
stitutionally sufficient procedures, and the availability of other collec-
tion methods." 71
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, ............ Mass.
-.......... , 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J.
Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970). The Supreme Court of California
has developed a consumer protection theory for the urban tenant:
Through a residential lease, a tenant seeks to purchase "housing" from his
landlord for a specified period of time. The landlord "sells" housing, enjoy-
ing a much greater opportunity, incentive and capacity than a tenant to
inspect and maintain the condition of his apartment building. A tenant may
reasonably expect that the product he is purchasing is fit for the purpose for
which it is obtained, that is, a living unit. Moreover, since a lease contract
specifies a designated period of time during which the tenant has a right to
inhabit the premises, the tenant may legitimately expect that the premises
will be fit for such habitation for the duration of the term of the lease....
Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 711 (1974).
67. 497 F.2d at 145.
68. Id. at 144-45.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 145.
71. Id.; see Appendix, supra note 11, at 237: "[The] Water Department
prepares and renders normally 65,000 water and sewer bills a month. Approxi-
mately, 2,200 accounts are notified that their bills are delinquent, and service
is discontinued on about 350 accounts because of non-payment."
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In his memorandum plaintiff argued:
The very definition of shelter or housing in the urban environ-
ment today has come to mean more than four walls and a roof.
It includes utilities, safe access and reasonable maintenance and
repair .... Water can thus be treated as either a direct necessity
entitled to due process protection in its own stead or as a defini-
tional element and necessary concomitant of "shelter," which has
been held to be a necessity ... [and] entitled to due process pro-
tection .... 72
72. Note, The Emerging Constitutional Issues in Public Utility Consumer
Law, 24 U. FLA. L. RPv. 744, 751 n.68 (1972). The Davis decision, however,
failed to analyze the relation between the right to utility service as an entitlement
and the concept of a "right to shelter." See Michelman, The Advent of a Right
to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Crv. Lin. L. REv. 207
(1970); Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86
I-Rv. L. Rav. 880, 903-10 (1973). When the city gave notice to the landlord
that the water service for his tenement would be terminated, the user of the
service, plaintiff-tenant, was faced with three choices: pay the landlord's utility
bill, remain in a residence that would rapidly become uninhabitable, or vacate
the residence. In effect, the municipal water department's action evicted the
tenant. Perhaps standards for procedural due process in the eviction of tenants
of public and federally subsidized housing will be applied to protect consumer-
tenants against the administrative discretion of public utilities. See Joy v.
Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th Cir. 1973) (notice and pre-eviction hearing
requirements for procedural due process in eviction from section 221(d)(3)
subsidized housing); Housing Authority v. United States Housing Authority,
468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972) (notice and pre-eviction hearing requirements for
procedural due process in eviction from public housing).
Regarding equal protection developments, the Supreme Court has held that
the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful possession of
one's home" are not to be protected as "fundamental interests." Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972). The Lindsey Court upheld the constitu-
tional validity of the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition
of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond
the term of his lease without the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to
the terms of the relevant agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the
assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relation-
ships are legislative, not judicial, functions. Nor should we forget that the
Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of private property or the
income therefrom.
Id. at 74. Contrary to the Gunther model for the 1971 term, the Court justified
the Oregon procedure as "rationally related" to the protection of the landlord's
interest in real property. See note 64 supra. The Court, however, held that the
Oregon statutory requirement of a double-bond by the tenant as a pre-condition
for an appeal from an adverse district court decision was not rationally related
to the statutory purpose of efficient administration of landlord-tenant disputes.
405 U.S. at 74-79. See also 7 URBAN L. ANN. 309 (1974); 58 VA. L. Rnv. 930
(1972).
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Davis has been cited as a significant application of procedural due
process for the protection of consumers of public utilities7 3 The
decision, however, may prove to have greater precedential significance
in its extension of the Marshall paradigm for equal protection analysis
to protect consumers against the monopolistic power of public utili-
ties in their collection policies.
Michael B. Phillips
73. See Note, Constitutional Safeguards for Public Utility Customers: Power
to the People, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 493, 518 (1973).
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